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#1
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| I'm in a discussion with someone who thinks that the Big Bang proves the necessity of God because it shows that the universe was not eternal and thus has a "beginning". Anything which has a beginning must have a cause or a creator. His argument hinges on the assertion that the big bang represented the "creation" of the universe including the creation of matter, energy, space, and time. He specifically says that physicists believe that prior to the big bang, these things did not exist! My response is to say that physicists say no such thing. In fact, I don't know how anyone can talk about what existed "prior" to the big bang. I think physicists claim that at the instant of the big bang, all the energy in the universe was compressed and concentrated in a very small space (perhaps a singularity). Then it all exploded outward. But no one is claiming that we can know that prior to that explosion, there was *nothing*. Right? All that energy may have been superconcentrated in a singularity but it did "exist", right? So the main thing I want to ask, is are there legitimate physicists that are saying: 1) there was absolutely *nothing* and then 2) there was a big bang where the universe appeared out of nothingness? I don't think so. John Black |
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#2
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| John Black wrote: As far as i know, you are quite correct. Also, remember, causality is a product of time, without time, causality doesn't exist. Without time, it doesn't make sence. Time was created at the Big Bang. Since time was NOT in effect before the Big Bang. The Big Bang does not require a cause. Sincerely Tobias. Just trying to delurk before asking questions. |
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#3
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| John Christiansen wrote: <snip> In the strictest sense, the singularity itself *was* the beginning. There was no 'before' for the BB because that (the singularity) is when (the timeless instant) and where (the miniscule universe) time itself began. Tom Davidson Richmond, VA |
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#4
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| "tadchem" wrote: Processes have a beginning and an end. Processes exist "in time", but time itself isn't a process, so it seems meaningless to talk about the 'beginning of time'. |
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#5
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#6
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| When time began so did 'process'. The universe requires both objects (nouns) and processes (verbs). 'Events' are time-based markers indicating where/when (in space-time) objects/processes begin/end. Both are required to make meaningful statements. The transition of the primal singularity to the first non-singularity (presumably some form of duality) was the first 'process,' and as it began, so began 'time.' Have you ever studied the Tao? Tom Davidson Richmond, VA |
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#7
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| > Have you ever studied the Tao? No -- is there a connection? Will Wittgenstein do instead? |
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#8
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| John Black wrote: What this means is that it is not just 3D space that is expanding, it is 4D spacetime that is expanding. This is consistent with all measurements, and GR predicts it as well, and all other GR predictions are consistent with measurements. Running this expansion backwards, one runs quickly to a point in past causality where spacetime extrapolates to a point. This means that space *and* time collapse at that point. Now, some physicists have pointed out that extrapolating GR back to a point is not fair, because we know GR has to go quantum in ways that we don't understand just shy of that point. OK, so we know that we can run the extrapolation back to 0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000000005 seconds, not quite at a point but pretty darned close. However, what *also* breaks down at that level is our basic notion of causality, both because time-ordering is essential to causality and because causality requires there be enough smoothness to spacetime to distinguish cause from effect, and neither of these apply at that point. Basically, applying a commonplace understanding of causality to that point in the history of the universe is a bad idea and a good example of incorrectly assuming that what works now has always worked and will always work. So, does this imply the need for a creator? No, not necessarily. Does it rule one out? No. We just don't know. PD |
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#9
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| John wrote: Wittgenstein may understand the parallelism between noun/verb and object/process, as he was quite the logician and linguist. The importance of the Tao is that it focuses on the archetype of two distinct and completely dissimilar entities (Yin and Yang) that nevertheless depend on each other intimately for their mutual existence - like the opposite sides of a coin and the other complementary quantities I have mentioned. Tom Davidson Richmond, VA |
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#10
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| "tadchem" wrote: "If we look at a river in which numbered logs are floating, we can describe events on land with reference to these, e.g., "When the 105th log passed, I ate dinner". Suppose the log makes a bang on passing me. We can say these bangs are separated by equal, or unequal, intervals. We could also say one set of bangs was twice as fast as another set. But the equality or inequality of intervals so measured is entirely different from that measured by a clock. The phrase "length of interval" has its sense in virtue of the way we determine it, and differs according to the method of measurement. Hence the criteria for equality of intervals between passing logs and for equality of intervals measured by a clock are different. We cannot say that two bangs two seconds apart differ only in degree from those an hour apart, for we have no feeling of rhythm if the interval is an hour long. And to say that one rhythm of bangs is faster than another is different from saying that the interval between these two bangs passed much more slowly than the interval between another pair. "Suppose that the passing logs seem to be equal distances apart. We have an experience of what might be called the velocity of these (though not what is measured by a clock). Let us say the river moves uniformly in this sense. But if we say time passed more quickly between logs 1 and 100 than between logs 100 and 200, this is only an analogy; really nothing has passed more quickly. To say time passes more quickly, or that time flows, is to imagine something flowing. We then extend the simile and talk about the direction of time. When people talk of the direction of time, precisely the analogy of a river is before them. Of course a river can change its direction of flow, but one has a feeling of giddiness when one talks of time being reversed. The reason is that the notion of flowing, of something, and of the direction of the flow is embodied in our language. "Suppose that at certain intervals situations repeated themselves, and that someone said time was circular. Would this be right or wrong? Neither. It would only be another way of expression, and we could just as well talk of a circular time. However, the picture of time as flowing, as having a direction, is one that suggests itself very vigorously. "Suppose someone said that the river on which the logs float had a beginning and will have an end, that there will be 100 more logs and that will be the end. It might be said that there is an experience which would verify these statements. Compare this with saying that time ceases. What is the criterion for its ceasing or for its going on? You might say that time ceases when "Time River" ceases. Suppose we had no substantive "time", that we talked only of the passing of logs. Then we could have a measurement of time without any substantive "time". Or we could talk of time coming to an end, meaning that the logs came to an end. We could in this sense talk of time coming to an end. "Can time go on apart from events? What is the criterion for time involved in "Events began 100 years ago and time began 200 years ago"? Has time been created, or was the world created in time? These questions are asked after the analogy of "Has this chair been made?", and are like asking whether order has been created (a "before" and "after"). "Time" as a substantive is terribly misleading. We have got to make the rules of the game before we play it. Discussion of "the flow of time" shows how philosophical problems arise. Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language practically but by extending it on looking at it. We form sentences and then wonder what they can mean. Once conscious of "time" as a substantive, we ask then about the creation of time." -- Wittgenstein, Lectures on Philosophy, section 13. |
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